The academic discipline of international relations desperately needs new ways of talking about the 10-60 states - the middle powers.

When President Yoon visits Washington, nobody will ask what kind of middle power it is, but when they ask why South Korea is not doing more to assist Ukraine – they’ll basically be asking the same thing.

Kazakhstan, a country too often unfairly treated as a punchline rather than a power, is treading a middle road – that of a middle power

A South Korean decision to pursue nuclear weapons would substantially transform strategic outlooks across the region.

After twenty-five years in government, academia and consultancy, with much of my time working on Korean Peninsula affairs, I’ve seen the best and worst North Korea Watchers.

Seoul’s Indo-Pacific Strategy has been broadly welcomed by a number of states, but making it future proof won’t be an easy task.

The middle power term will still be used because it’s an easy label to throw about for politicians and journalists but academics should be held to a higher standard.

In the end, stopping South Korea from heading down the nuclear path requires less academic waffling, and more diplomacy.

The Korean Peninsula is currently in a pattern of tit-for-tat provocation: short and long-range missile tests; combined training exercises; artillery live-fire exercises, and border area fighter jet sorties and would reach a new height with a nuclear test.

Twenty years ago, the United States had an opportunity to prevent North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, and in twenty years’ time, nobody should look back and say the United States once had an opportunity to prevent South Korea’s nuclear weapons program.