As U.S. attention drifts away from East Asia, the unthinkable becomes thinkable. For decades, South Korea has relied on the U.S. alliance not just for security against North Korea, but as a strategic foundation—anchoring its diplomacy, economy, and identity. But what if the United States decides, not under duress but by design, to pull back?
In the film Cool Hand Luke, there's a scene where a prison guard tells Luke he’s sorry for putting him in the box. Luke, bloodied and unbroken, replies: 'Saying sorry don’t make it right.' The moment cuts to the heart of power, communication, and the emptiness of regret when the system remains unchanged.
When President Lee visits the White House later this month, it will not be a meeting. To quote Admiral Ackbar—it’s a trap! Seoul shouldn’t just be worried about the immediate outcome but also whether this will be the beginning of the end for the alliance.
As empires weaken or collapse, they either start wars to preserve themselves—or provoke wars through the chaos of their absence. The greater the empire’s role in shaping global or regional order, the more damaging its decline is likely to be—both for itself and for others.
Diplomacy is dead. Where it stood now sits political grift, ego, and Big Mac burger wrappers.
In South Korea, the idea of a post-American Asia—that is, a regional order no longer anchored by the U.S. alliance system—invites wildly divergent visions. Nowhere are these differences more vivid than at the ideological extremes.
Hugh White’s recent essay in The Quarterly argues that Australia should be preparing now for the departure of the U.S. He notes “it is futile for Australia to frame its defence around U.S. deterrence of China when America itself is not serious about it.” His essay is understandably focused on Australia, but much of what he says applies equally to South Korea. Should South Korea be preparing now for the departure of the U.S.?
The Indo-Pacific is not Europe. Not all states agree there is a common adversary, there is no formal alliance structure, and the institutional mechanisms that make NATO rearmament both credible and coherent, doesn’t exist.
Kenneth Waltz’s “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better” seems to have passed from academic to popular reading in South Korea. I saw an ajumma in the park reading it while her poodle panted beside her in a dog pram. It was a very unique situation.
Each state has their own rationales. South Korea has three: diplomatic timing, strategic delay; and the decreased relevance of NATO-IP4 framework.
